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QUICK OR CHEAP?
BREAKING POINTS IN DYNAMIC MARKETS∗
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS⋄, HEINRICH H. NAX§, AND BARY S. R. PRADELSKI⋄
Abstract. We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically
over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching
a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending
objectives: a) to reduce players’ waiting time before getting matched; and
b) to form efficient pairs in order to reduce matching costs. We show that such
markets are characterized by a quick or cheap dilemma: Under a large class of
distributional assumptions, there is no ‘free lunch’, i.e., there exists no clearing
schedule that is simultaneously optimal along both objectives. We further
identify a unique breaking point signifying a stark reduction in matching cost
contrasted by an increase in waiting time. Generalizing this model, we identify
two regimes: one, where no free lunch exists; the other, where a window of
opportunity opens to achieve a free lunch. Remarkably, greedy scheduling is
never optimal in this setting.
1. Introduction
Many economic interactions require the dynamic matching of heterogeneous
agents that arrive stochastically to a two-sided market. Examples include the dy-
namic matching of clients and providers in markets for jobs and services, of buyers
and sellers in financial markets, of taxis and passengers on road networks, of donors
and recipients in organ exchanges, etc.1
It is known that many of these markets vary substantially in terms of efficiency
(Roth and Xing, 1994, 1997). The focus of our investigation is on a crucial aspect
of market design in this context, namely the scheduling of clearing events. The
goal of “making a thick market” (Roth, 2012) is to find the best schedule of market
clearing so that sufficient clients and providers are in the market to allow for stable
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and efficient matches over time while not waiting excessively. Designing an optimal
clearing policy thus requires optimizing along the following two objectives:
(1) To reduce the coexistence of agents on the two sides of the market.
(2) To match parties in such a way so as to minimize cost (or maximize pro-
ductivity).
In pursuit of these two goals, clearing schedules need to be formulated to address
the following key question: How long should the social planner wait between two
clearing events?
To illustrate the above, consider the example of a governmental employment bu-
reau faced with a dynamically evolving job market where job offers and job seekers
arrive to the system stochastically over time. The bureau has two aims, namely to
reduce the coexistence of vacancies and job seekers, and to match vacancies with
the skills of individual job seekers so as to maximize productivity. Waiting times
incur costs via unemployment benefits, as well as costs due to productivity losses
incurred by badly staffed vacancies.
To gain in generality, we abstract away from application-specific details (such
as the particular structure of the application and recruitment processes). This
allows us to focus on the trade-offs between two different and concurrent objectives,
waiting time and matching cost. Perhaps surprisingly, this quick or cheap dilemma
is not easily resolvable as greedy scheduling policies are generally not optimal in
this context.
Related work. Dating back to the 1950s, the first related strand of work focuses on
behavioral aspects underlying the dynamics of unemployment and job vacancies in
labor markets (Dow and Dicks-Mireaux, 1958). These analyses identify avenues to
reduce waiting – i.e., the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies – by better
understanding the behavior of job seekers and job providers. Lines of reasoning
proposed to explain the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies include the
classical search models of McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970), and Lucas and Prescott
(1974), as well as more recent models with workforce inertia due to Shimer (2007).2
We complement this literature with a view that some degree of waiting is actually
beneficial from a social welfare perspective as it enables market thickening – which
in turn enables mismatch reduction. To illustrate this, consider the example of
Shimer (2007), where some laid-off steel workers are not immediately given vacant
positions as nurses. This may indeed be deemed optimal by a social planner when
– by delaying their match – these nurse vacancies eventually are taken up by better
nurses and the jobless steel workers find other jobs in the steel industry that might
become available in the future.3
The second strand of related work comes from the matching literature and ex-
tends the canonical static matching framework to a dynamic setting.4 As in the
example of steel workers and nurses above, mismatch in dynamic environments may
2Note that Shimer (2007) terms his explanandum “mismatch” (as opposed to “waiting”), a term
the matching literature uses to describe suboptimal matchings, which may be confusing.
3Waiting is explained behaviorally through inertia in Shimer (2007), that is, by the argument
that steel workers stay close to their factories hoping that they reopen; Lucas and Prescott (1974)
propose a different interpretation whereby waiting is due to the fact that steel workers must
actively spend some time searching for these nursing jobs elsewhere.
4The canonical static frameworks underlying our analyses were pioneered by Egervary (1931);
Koenig (1931), and Edmonds (1965); see also Gale and Shapley (1962) for matching with ordinal
preferences.
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occur due to temporal inconsistencies, whereby, a posteriori, better matches were
precluded by inferior matches that were formed earlier on. Therefore, some delay
may be optimal from a social planner perspective in order to reduce mismatch.
From a practical viewpoint, the challenge is to identify optimal mechanisms that
thicken and clear the market in a way that balances these two objectives.
In this regard, Akbarpour et al. (2017), Ashlagi et al. (2019), Baccara et al.
(2018), and Loertscher et al. (2018) break new ground in identifying optimal clear-
ing schedules.5 More precisely, Akbarpour et al. (2017), in the spirit of an organ
exchange application such as the ‘kidney exchange’, identify the optimal mechanism
to maximize the number of matches, that is, to minimize the number of agents per-
ishing resulting from failing to get recipients matched with donors in time. In the
model of Akbarpour et al. (2017), agents from both sides of the market arrive and
leave stochastically and all carry identical match values, i.e., they are of the same
type (in the spirit of each life being worth the same). However, there are two types
of agents, as some matches are feasible and others are infeasible, thus rendering
some agents easier – others harder – to match.6 The optimal mechanism identified
by Akbarpour et al. (2017) minimizes the number of unmatched patients based on
information concerning arrivals and departures, which may involve delaying com-
patible matches. Without such information, greedy scheduling is always optimal in
this setting. In fact, Ashlagi et al. (2019) show that greedy policies are generally
optimal, even if information about departure times is available when the above kind
of ‘kidney exchange’ markets becomes large.
In a related setting, Baccara et al. (2018) and Loertscher et al. (2018) introduce
binary diversifications of agents and the notion of waiting costs instead of perishing
rates as in Akbarpour et al. (2017). In Baccara et al. (2018), agents arrive in donor-
recipient pairs and recipients are allowed to decline matches in order to remain in the
market. This is motivated by the applications under scrutiny which include, among
others, child adoption. As a result, one of the study’s key focuses is on strategic
incentives and their role in determining market outcomes. Their optimal clearing
policy is discriminatory, in that it involves matching same-type pairs greedily, and
delaying up to some threshold when there are only cross-type pairs in the market.
By contrast, Loertscher et al. (2018) introduce a common discount factor (instead of
a constant waiting cost) for both types of agents (as well as for the social planner).7
They focus on the analysis of the possibility of efficient trade and rent extraction
by the market maker.
In theoretical computer science, the study of related questions dates back at
least to the pioneering paper of Karp et al. (1990).8 To the best of our knowledge,
5These are inspired by some earlier papers on dynamic matching in organ exchange by Uenver
(2010); Zenios (2002). See Akbarpour et al. (2017) for a discussion. See also Bloch and Houy
(2012), Kurino (2014), and Leshno (2012) who study related queuing models where one side of
the market is already present (such as in the housing market).
6This can be modeled by means of a dynamically changing compatibility graph where edges
represent feasible matches.
7The discount factor is motivated by the study’s focus on financial markets, and would be
determined by risk-free rate, beta, and risk premium. Related analyses of financial markets
include Budish et al. (2015) and Wah et al. (2015) (see also Wah et al. (2017) for market-making
more generally) who consider periodic clearing of order books to abate certain market phenomena
such as volatility that stem from high-frequency trading.
8Karp et al. (1990) and subsequent work – similar to its economic counterparts – focus on
models with two market sides, where by contrast one side is typically present to begin with and
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Emek et al. (2016) were the first in this strand of research to consider the scenario
where all agents arrive on the market over time (instead of just one market side).
They present a non-bipartite model where requests arrive stochastically from one
of n different locations to study the performance of different algorithms in terms
of worst-case matching and waiting cost.9 In the setting of Emek et al. (2016), the
specific match costs result from the distance between agents’ locations so that, for
a patient social planner, it is optimal to wait and only match agents who are at the
same location.
Finally, motivated by ride-sharing applications, Ashlagi et al. (2017) extend the
model of Emek et al. (2016) to a bipartite setting where agents independently
arrive at different locations. Ashlagi et al. (2017) study the performance of a
family of clearing schedules along the two axes of waiting vs. mismatch separately,
an approach that we extend in order to formulate the induced trade-off between
waiting time and the cost of matching.
Contributions of the paper. Our paper examines dynamic markets with an infinite
type space (in contrast to one or two types), a framework we call the dynamic
clearing game. Our point of departure is the static assignment game of Shapley
and Shubik (1972) to which we add a dynamic layer whereby clients and providers
arrive to the market stochastically and independently. Skills are drawn from a large
class of type distributions so that every match is possible but some matches are
more costly than others. At each matching event, the social planner must decide
who to match with whom, and how long to wait before the next matching event. As
such, the social planner is called to weigh, on the one hand, mismatches incurred
from matching clients and providers suboptimally; and, on the other hand, the
agents’ waiting time. To address this dual issue, we study clearing schedules in
terms of when to match in a fully heterogeneous setting where the social planner
has no information regarding the cost of matching couples currently in the market
and has no information about the future arrivals of individuals.
For concreteness, we start by studying a micro-level model where costs of individ-
ual matches are distributed according to independent exponential random variables.
Whilst our results hold for other distributions too, this model has the advantage of
being tractable in closed form. In more detail, we first establish a class of optimal
clearing schedules for two extreme types of single-objective social planners – that
is, for social planners who only care about minimizing waiting time (in which case
greedy is best) or mismatch costs (resulting in endless delay), but not both at the
same time. Second, we show that these two objectives are mutually incompati-
ble, and multi-objective social planners (who care about both) face a fundamental
trade-off. Specifically, there is no ‘free lunch’, that is there is no clearing sched-
ule that is approximately optimal in terms of both waiting time and matching cost.
Remarkably, the greedy clearing schedule is sub-optimal for every multi-objective
social planner.
incoming agents from the other side can only match with some of the present agents according to
a compatibility graph (see Mehta (2013) for an overview and Aggarwal et al. (2011) for extensions
to vertex-weighted matching).
9Azar et al. (2017) obtain additional results in terms of upper and lower bounds for the original
model. Emek et al. (2019) obtain sharper results for a two-location model. There are also other
extensions such as allowing for a stochastic graph (Anderson et al., 2015; Ashlagi et al., 2018).
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Building on the no free lunch result, we proceed to fill the spectrum between
matching cost and waiting time minimization. We do so by introducing a class
of clearing schedules covering a wide range of social planning desiderata between
waiting time and matching cost, and achieving a continuous trade-off between the
two. To explore the finer aspects of this trade-off, we introduce a utility model for
the social planner whereby the associated utility of matching cost is of the same
order as the agents’ utility of waiting time. Under this model, we show that there
exists a non-trivial clearing schedule achieving this balance, and we show that this
schedule is effectively unique (up to asymptotic order considerations).
Finally, we generalize our key findings by studying different decay rates of match-
ing costs (instead of focusing on one decay rate that results from the micro-founded
match costs). We identify two regimes. One, where no free lunch continues to hold.
The other, where the benefit from waiting is growing quickly enough, such that a
window of opportunity opens and it is possible to get a free lunch. As before, in
both regimes, greedy scheduling is generally sub-optimal.
Compared to the existing literature on the trade-off between waiting and mis-
match (both in economics and computer science) our model introduces incomplete
information about the distribution of past and future match costs and considers
an infinite type space in a tractable model. As a consequence, the social planner
tries to resolve the trade-off between matching optimally and waiting time in light
of incomplete information. Incomplete information in our setting implies that the
social planner must employ clearing schedules that do not take as input the relative
strengths of current and future matches (since the latter is unknown), thus yielding
qualitatively new results.
In contrast to prior results for markets with one or two types of match costs
where lack of information resulted in optimality of some form of greedy scheduling,
we find that greedy clearing is generally not optimal in the presence of many types.
Hence, the quick-versus-cheap trade-off is more intricate than previously found.
Moreover, our results may actually also have consequences for applications that
have been studied before too (e.g. kidney exchange) if other match value metrics
(e.g. potential years of life lost or disability-adjusted life years) are used that would
produce more than binary match values. By studying fully heterogeneous match
costs we have to rely on different mathematical tools compared to previous analyses,
which were often able to reduce the induced dynamics to discrete Markov processes.
The key technical innovations of our paper concern the concurrent consideration
of a continuum of types, independent arrivals, and incomplete information. In turn,
these contributions rely on a range of previously unused tools from probability
theory and disordered systems to obtain closed-form solutions. These underlying
results are concerned with the expected matching cost for given instances of random,
static assignment games. In particular, in static assignment games with the same
number of clients and providers and exp(1) distributed edge weights, Aldous (2001)
proved the long-standing conjecture that the expected minimum weight matching
converges to pi2/6 (i.e., as the number of players is growing). This result was later
extended by Waestlund (2005) to assignment games with match costs drawn from
non-identical exponential distributions.10 By leveraging the techniques of Aldous
10To the best of our knowledge, the work of Walkup (1979) is the first to pose the question,
while Mezard and Parisi (1987) conjectured the specific limit value. We also leverage the analyses
of Buck et al. (2002) and Linusson and Waestlund (2004) who obtain results for the expected values
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(2001) and Waestlund (2005), we are able to compute the expected matching cost
for every ‘snapshot in time’ of the dynamic clearing game. This provides strong
foundations for our proofs which are then focused on estimating the fluctuations
that result from the random arrival of clients and providers and their randomly
drawn match costs. To achieve this, we use several approximation techniques (in
particular, the approximation of the arrival process by a continuous-time Wiener
process), which allow us to port over several results from martingale limit theory
(such as the law of the iterated logarithm).
Paper outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the dynamic clearing game and the performance measures relevant for
our analysis. In Section 3, we show that a social planner who cares about both
waiting and mismatch faces a fundamental and non-negligible trade-off. We then
go on to analyze a natural selection of clearing schedules in Section 4, which cover
the whole range of possible trade-offs. In Section 5, we commit to a specific utility
function that specifies how the social planner values waiting time versus matching
cost and find the unique optimal clearing schedule. Section 6 generalizes the analysis
and shows that there are two regimes, one where ‘free lunch’ is not achievable and
one where it is achievable. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss practical implications
and of avenues for future research.
2. The model
In this section, we introduce the model, which we shall refer to as the dynamic
clearing game.
The dynamic clearing game. Consider the following model of a dynamic two-sided
market evolving in continuous time τ ∈ [0,∞). At each tick of a Poisson clock with
rate 1 an agent enters the market; this agent could be either a client or a provider,
with equal probability.11 To keep track of the number of agents in both sides of the
market, let C(τ) and P(τ) denote the set of clients and providers that have entered
the market by time τ (and possibly already left again), and let NC(τ) = |C(τ)| and
NP(τ) = |P(τ)| be the respective numbers thereof. Then, the number of agents on
the short side of the market will be written N(τ) = min{NC(τ), NP (τ)}.12
As in the static assignment model of Shapley and Shubik (1972) on which we
build, we consider a one-to-one matching market where each client is to be matched
to at most one provider and vice versa; then, once a couple is matched, both agents
leave the market. For example, in labor market language, each job seeker gets at
most one job, and each vacancy concerns exactly one worker; once a match has
been made, the governmental job bureau removes the matched pair from its ledger,
and the process continues.
of finite instances of the latter models, showing – as a byproduct – that the value is increasing
with the number of agents. For a survey of this literature, we refer the reader to Krokhmal and
Pardalos (2009).
11We are using here the terms ‘client’ and ‘provider’ in a generic sense, just to illustrate the
difference between the two sides of the market. As we explain below, what is important from a
modeling perspective is that ‘clients’ are to be matched to ‘providers’ (as in our running example
of job vacancies and job seekers).
12In a slight (but convenient) abuse of notation, we will sometimes write NC(t), NP (t), and
N(t) to denote respectively the number of clients, providers, and agents at the short side of the
market when the t-th agent enters the market – specifically, letting τ(t) denote the time at which
the t-th agent enters the market, we will write NC(t) ≡ NC(τ(t)), etc.
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For concreteness, we shall next define a specific family of match cost distributions.
This is done solely to streamline our presentation: Our methodology allows us to be
more general as we discuss in Section 6. Suppose that the quality of a (candidate)
pair is characterized by an inherent match parameter λij where a higher parameter
will represent a lower expected match cost. Match costs are independently and
exponentially distributed with rate λij .
13
Specifically, we posit that the match cost wij > 0 when client i ∈ C is matched to
provider j ∈ P is an independent draw from an exponential distribution of rate λij
for any time τ , that is, wij ∼ exp(λij). For example, a popular model assumes that
λij is composed by additively separable components describing the agents’ types
and a couple-specific term depending possibly on both the identity of the agents and
their types (Kanoria et al., 2018). For generality, our only assumption regarding
the rate parameters λij is that they are bounded from below by λ, from above by λ,
and have mean value λ, that is, λ = limτ→∞[NC(τ)+NP (τ)]
−1∑NC(τ)
i=1
∑NP(τ)
j=1 λij .
The social planner. Throughout the sequel, we assume the existence of a social
planner who, whenever an agent arrives on the market, observes the arrival; other
than that, the social planner has no other information regarding the arrival process
of the agents (or the distribution of their match costs). Due to this lack of informa-
tion, the social planner has no basis to judge whether a particular agent arriving
in the market is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and is thus left with the challenge of choosing a
clearing schedule with which to operate the market. In the sequel, we will also write
A ≡ A(τ) for the number of clients/providers that have been assigned a partner up
to time τ , and R(τ) = NC(τ)+NP (τ)−2A(τ) for the number of unmatched agents
up to time τ .
With all this in hand, a clearing schedule (CS) will be a rule that determines:
(i) At which points in time τ ∈ (0,∞) to trigger a matching event (ME), possibly
depending on NC(τ), NP(τ) and A(τ).
(ii) Which players to match at a given matching event, possibly depending on the
current match costs of agents who have already arrived to the market until
time τ .
After a matching event, the players who are being matched leave the market, while
the unmatched players remain on the market.
In what follows, we shall focus on clearing schedules that match a single couple
per matching event. In particular, the clearing schedules we analyze will match
the couple with the minimal matching cost in each matching event.14 Restricting
ourselves to these kinds of clearing schedules is motivated by our aim to study
clearing schedules that can be paired with a market mechanism (e.g., a two-sided
auction). Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Rustichini et al. (1994) show the
general impossibility to have ex-post efficient and budget balanced mechanisms for
two-sided market games with private information. Their results rely on the assump-
tion that, with positive probability, any given client-provider pair have valuations
for each other such that trade is not individually rational for both at any price.
13As mentioned by Aldous (2001) and developed in detail by Janson (1999, Section 2) gener-
alizations to larger classes of distributions are easily obtained. For ease of exposition we stick to
exponential distributions with the exception of Section 6 that generalizes our main results.
14The only clearing schedule that we consider and which violates this principle is the first-come,
first-served (FCFS) clearing schedule which we describe in Section 3.
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Since the latter doesn’t hold in our setting, one could micro-found the interaction
avoiding the impossibility, that is, define a mechanism that is ex-post efficient and
budget balanced. We shall assume throughout the analysis the existence of such a
mechanism; however, given our focus on the social planner an explicit analysis of
such mechanisms is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Now, as discussed before, the social planner aims to match clients and providers
optimally along two axes: a) to reduce the coexistence of clients and providers
(i.e., waiting time); and b) to match clients and providers in a way that minimizes
matching cost (i.e., mismatch). Beginning with the latter, the expected matching
cost for the first A couples is defined as
costCS(A) ≡ E
[
A∑
k=1
wik,jk
]
(1)
where wik ,jk is the match cost of the k-th matched couple and the expectation is
taken with respect to the random arrival of clients and providers and the random-
ness of the match costs. Similarly, the expected waiting time of a clearing schedule
until time T is defined as
waitCS(T ) ≡ E
[∫ T
0
R(τ) dτ
]
(2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random arrival of agents in the
market. In the sections that follow, we will explore the optimization of these two
performance metrics, and the trade-offs that arise when trying to minimize both.
3. The trade-off between waiting time and matching costs
Our analysis begins with the case of a single-minded social planner. Specifically,
we investigate which clearing schedule a social planner would employ if either only
caring about the expected waiting time, or only caring about the expected matching
cost. After we deal with these two cases separately, we shall proceed to show that
these objectives are mutually incompatible and lead to an unavoidable trade-off for
the social planner.
Single-minded social planners. First, a social planner who is optimizing the agents’
expected waiting time will choose a clearing schedule which leaves no unmatched
couples at any point in time. To do so, we will consider a ‘greedy’ clearing schedule,
denoted CSgreedy, which performs a minimum weight matching whenever there is
exactly one unmatched client/provider pair in the market. Second, a social plan-
ner who is optimizing the agents’ expected matching cost will choose a clearing
schedule which – ideally – waits until everyone has arrived in the market and then
matches agents optimally (thus minimizing the sum of match costs).15 That is, the
hypothetical ‘patient’ clearing schedule, denoted CSpatient, should be preferred by
any social planner who is only concerned with the expected matching cost.
The implementation of these schedules leads to the following matching cost and
waiting time:
15To make such a clearing schedule realistic, all agents would need to arrive in the market in
finite time; since this schedule will mostly serve as a theoretical comparison baseline, we will not
consider this issue in detail.
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Proposition 1. The optimal clearing schedules for a single-objective social planner
are:
(1) The patient clearing schedule CSpatient is optimal with respect to matching cost
minimization; in particular, for all A ≥ 1, we have:
log 2
λ
≤ costpatient(A) ≤ pi
2
6λ
(2) The greedy clearing schedule CSgreedy is optimal with respect to waiting time
minimization; in particular, for all τ ≥ 0, we have:
waitgreedy(τ) =
2
3
τ3/2
Remark. In view of Proposition 1, the expected matching cost of CSpatient and the
expected waiting time of CSgreedy will serve as the benchmark for comparing the
matching cost and waiting time of any other clearing schedule.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove our claims for each of the two clearing schedules
separately.
Part 1: Matching cost minimization. For the first assertion, note that the expo-
nential distribution is closed under scaling by a positive factor, i.e., if X ∼ exp(κ)
then µX ∼ exp(κ/µ). In our case, this implies that
wij ∼ exp(λij) ⇐⇒ wij ∼ 1
λij
exp(1) (3)
We have that for all i ∈ C, j ∈ P , the distribution of wij is first-order stochastically
dominated by λ−1 exp(1). Thus the expected weight is upper bounded by the
simplified problem where all match costs are distributed according to λ−1 exp(1).
With this in mind, we will simplify notation in the rest of the proof by setting
λ = 1.
By the summation formula of Buck et al. (2002) and Linusson and Waestlund
(2004), we have for the expected weight of the minimum A-matching (note that
A = N , recalling that N = min{NC, NP}):
Emin
[
N∑
k=1
wik,jk
]
=
∑
i,j≥0
i+j<N
1
(NC − i) · (NP − j) . (4)
Thus, we readily have
costpatient(N) = Emin
[
N∑
k=1
wik,jk
]
≤
∑
i,j≥0
i+j<N
1
(N − i) · (N − j) . (5)
To proceed, by Waestlund (2009, Lemma 3.1) we have
∑
i,j≥0
i+j<N
1
(N − i) · (N − j) =
N∑
k=1
1
k2
≤ ζ(2), (6)
where ζ(2) =
∑∞
n=1 1/n
2 = pi2/6 is the Basel constant. Returning to our original
problem, we conclude that costpatient(A) ≤ pi2/(6λ), as claimed.
To compute the lower bound, we need to consider the expected match cost for
A = 1, because matching more players would only serve to increase the expected
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matching cost. In the patient clearing schedule for A = 1, the process terminates
when at least one client and at least one provider have entered the market. Let
Y ≥ 2 be the number of agents required to observe at least one client and one
provider. Then the event Y = k + 1 is the same event as the union of the disjoint
events ‘the first k agents are clients and the (k+1)-th agent is a provider’ and ‘the
first k agents are providers and the (k + 1)-th agent is a client’. Each of the latter
events has probability 1/2k+1, so P(Y = k + 1) = 2−k. Moreover, as we prove in
Lemma 8, for Y = k + 1, the expected minimum match cost is given by 1
λ·k . Thus
for A = 1, we get
costpatient(N) =
∞∑
k=1
1
λk
P(Y = k + 1) =
1
λ
∞∑
k=1
1
2kk
=
log 2
λ
, (7)
where the last equality follows from the series expansion log(1− x) = −x− x2/2−
x3/3− · · · applied to x = 1/2.
Part 2: Waiting time minimization. For our second assertion, note that, at any
point in time, there are either no clients or no providers in the market. In view
of this, let Sτ be the difference of clients and providers who have arrived to the
market until time τ , that is, Sτ = NC(τ) −NP(τ). Then, for all T > 0, we get:
waitgreedy(T ) = E
[∫ T
0
|Sτ | dτ
]
=
∫ T
0
E[|Sτ |] dτ (8)
where the latter equality holds by Tonelli’s theorem (since |Sτ | is non-negative).
Applying Tonelli’s theorem a second time, we can consider the case where the
expectation with respect to the arrival times is taken first. To do so, consider the
process where at the fixed points in time τ = 1, 2, . . . an agent arrives to the market
and let S¯τ be the difference of clients and providers who have arrived to the market
at time τ . We then have:
E
[∫ T
0
|Sτ | dτ
]
=
∫ T
0
E[|Sτ |] dτ =
∫ T
0
E[|S¯τ |] dτ (9)
It is well-known that for τ → ∞ the appropriately rescaled random walk S¯τ con-
verges in distribution to the Wiener process Wτ (Kac, 1947). Thus, for large T ,
Eq. (9) gives
E
[∫ T
0
|Sτ |dτ
]
=
∫ T
0
E[|Wτ |] dτ =
∫ T
0
√
Var(Wτ ) dτ =
∫ T
0
√
τ dτ =
2
3
T 3/2. 
This concludes the analysis of a single-minded social planner who either only
cares about the expected waiting time, or onlythe expected matching cost.
Multi-objective social planners. Going beyond the narrow view of a single-minded
social planner, we proceed below to examine the case of social planners that care
about both the expected cost of matching and the agents’ overall expected waiting
time. Natural candidates to evaluate a clearing schedule in this context are the
expected matching ratio and the expected waiting ratio, defined below as follows:
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(1) The expected matching ratio of a clearing schedule CS is
α ≡ α(A) = costCS(A)
costpatient(A)
. (10)
(2) The expected waiting ratio of a clearing schedule CS is
β ≡ β(τ) = waitCS(τ)
waitgreedy(τ)
. (11)
Note that CSpatient is optimal with respect to expected matching cost while CSgreedy
is optimal with respect to expected waiting time.
Going forward, note that all candidate clearing schedules can be characterized
by a function f : R+ → R+ such that the k-th (k ∈ N) couple is matched when
⌈f(k)⌉ agents are on the short side of the market. Denote a clearing schedule that
is defined via a function f by CSf . Without any restrictions on f this includes all
possible clearing schedules that always match the couple with the minimal match
cost. However, given that we wish to analyze the asymptotic regime where enough
agents have entered the market, we focus below on a natural class of functions
introduced by Hardy (1910) which make such comparisons possible. Specifically,
each function in this class is defined, for all x ≥ 0, by a finite combination of the
basic arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, raising to a power, and their
inverses), operating on the variable x and on real constants. Hardy (1910, Theorem,
page 18) shows that for any two such functions, f and g, either f = ω(g), f = Θ(g),
or f = o(g).
Then, for such functions, we will use the following asymptotic notations:
f(x) = O(g(x)) if f(x) < c · g(x) for some c > 0 constant and x sufficiently large.
f(x) = Ω(g(x)) is the inverse O notation (f(x) > c · g(x) for x sufficiently large).
f(x) = Θ(g(x)) if there exist two constants k,K ≥ 0 and a positive integer x0 such
that kg(x) ≤ f(x) ≤ Kg(x) for all x ≥ x0.
For g(x) non-zero f(x) = o(g(x)) if limx→∞
f(x)
g(x) = 0 and f(x) = ω(g(x)) if
limx→∞
f(x)
g(x) =∞.
In light of the above, the first question that arises is whether there exists a
clearing schedule that is optimal along both axes (at least, asymptotically). To
formalize this, we say that a clearing schedule CS has finite expected matching ratio
if lim supA(τ)>0 α(A(τ)) < ∞; likewise, we say that clearing schedule has finite
expected waiting ratio if lim supτ>0 β(τ) <∞.
The following theorem shows that the answer to the above question is a resound-
ing ‘no’:
Theorem 2 (‘No free lunch’). There exists no clearing schedule simultaneously
achieving finite ratios for both expected matching cost and waiting time.
Theorem 2 illustrates that multi-objective social planners are faced with a crucial
trade-off independently of their specific utility function – provided of course that
they care about both matching cost and waiting time in a non-trivial way. In
addition, Theorem 2 justifies the performance measures for the two dimensions
of mismatch (expected matching ratio and waiting ratio) and in particular the
sufficiency to analyze them in terms of orders of τ (or A = A(τ)).
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove this result by contradiction; specifically, we find a
necessary condition for a clearing schedule to have finite expected matching ratio
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and then show that clearing schedules satisfying this condition cannot have a finite
expected waiting ratio.
To make this precise, consider the clearing schedule CSf that matches the k-th
couple when N − (k − 1) = ⌈f(k)⌉. We shall show that a necessary condition for a
clearing schedule CSf to have finite expected matching ratio is
f(k) = ω(k1/2) (12)
To show this, consider the clearing schedule that matches the k-th couple when
at least ⌈k1/2⌉ players are on the short side of the market; with a fair degree of
hindsight, denote this clearing schedule as CSγ=1/2.
16 As we show in Theorem 3,
this clearing schedule has α(A) = Θ(logA). Thus, in order for another schedule
CSf to have finite expected matching ratio, matching events have to happen orders
of magnitude later than in CSγ=1/2. Concretely, for k large enough the k-th couple
is cleared at time τCSf (k) = ω(τCSγ=1/2(k)). It follows that Eq. (12) holds.
We can now analyze the expected waiting time for CSf such that Eq. (12) holds
for f . To construct a lower bound, consider the alternative arrival process, where
clients and providers alternatingly arrive to the market. Note that for any given
clearing schedule this process incurs lower waiting time. For the clearing schedule
we consider the waiting time of this alternative arrival process is precisely governed
by the fact that the k-th match takes place when at least f(k) players are on the
short side of the market. Further, note that τ(A) is clearly smaller for this new
arrival process compared to the original process. Given that we only need to show
that the waiting time is increasing in A it suffices to show that it is increasing in
τ (not conditioned on A). Thus, the waiting time is lower bounded by using the
approximation by the Wiener process (as in the proof of Proposition 1) and by
observing that arrival is governed by a Poisson clock of rate 1:∫ T
0
2f(τ)dτ = ω
(∫ T
0
2
√
τ dτ
)
= ω(T 3/2) (13)
By Proposition 1(ii), the optimal expected waiting time is (2/3)T 3/2, so we conclude
that the expected waiting ratio is lower bounded by ω(T 3/2)/T 3/2 = ω(1) and our
proof is complete. 
This concludes our first result for multi-objective social planners, showing that
the trade-off between cost of matching and waiting time is essential.
4. Interpolating between waiting time and matching cost
In this section, we analyze a class of clearing schedules covering a broad spectrum
of social planning desiderata interpolating between matching cost and waiting time.
To begin, recall that Proposition 1 provides the expected matching cost of the
patient clearing schedule CSpatient (which minimizes mismatches) and the expected
waiting time of the greedy clearing schedule CSgreedy (which minimizes waiting
times). Interpolating between these two ‘extreme’ schedules, we shall consider
below a class of clearing schedules where the social planner waits for some length
of time in order to accrue some intermediate number of agents on both sides of the
16See Section 4 for detailed definitions.
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CSFCFS match players as soon as possible on a first-come, first-served basis
CSgreedy match players as soon as possible
CSγ
match the k-th couple when Θ(kγ) players are on the short side of
the market (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1)
CSpatient match players optimally after everyone has arrived
CSbalanced
match the k-th couple when Θ(k1/2(log k)1/3) players are on the short
side of the market.
Table 1. Overview of the various clearing schedules considered in the
sequel. Note that all schedules other than CSFCFS match the couple with
the minimum match cost at each matching event.
market. Concretely, we shall study clearing schedules that match the k-th couple
when N − k = f(k), i.e., when f(k) players are on the short side of the market.17
For concreteness, we restrict ourselves to clearing schedules of the form
f(k) = Θ(kγ) for some γ ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
For γ = 0, the induced clearing schedules match players once a constant threshold is
reached; in particular, the greedy schedule is recovered when f ≡ 1 (corresponding
to γ = 0). More generally, we shall denote clearing schedules of the above form by
CSγ and write CSγ=1/2 for the clearing schedule with γ = 1/2. Similarly we shall
use the notation αγ for the expected matching ratio of CSγ and βγ for the expected
waiting ratio of CSγ .
In addition to the clearing schedules induced by the assumptions above, we shall
also consider another natural schedule based on the principle of first-come, first-
served (FCFS), i.e., when agents are matched as soon as possible on a first-come,
first-served basis. This schedule, which we denote by CSFCFS, differs from CSgreedy
in terms of who is matched with whom (first-come, first-served vs. minimum cost
matching) but not regarding when a matching event occurs. As such, given that
CSFCFS does not take into account matching costs, it is not reasonable to expect
that it will perform well on any dimension other than the agents’ expected waiting
times. On the other hand, it exhibits ‘fairness’ relative to the agents’ arrival times,
a feature which is crucial in many applications.18
Overview of results. Table 1 summarizes all clearing schedules analyzed below (in-
cluding a ‘balanced’ schedule, CSbalanced, that we discuss in Section 5). Our results
(in terms of each schedule’s expected matching and waiting ratio) are then sum-
marized in Table 2: as can be seen, the family of schedules under study captures
the full range between schedules that are ‘good’ relative to mismatches and ‘bad’
relative to waiting times, and vice versa.
In view of these results, the clearing schedule CSγ=1/2 can be seen as a phase
transition between two markedly different regimes. On the one hand, for γ < 1/2,
17Recall that N = min{NC , NP}.
18Indeed, this may be a desirable feature in applications such as processor time requests in
distributed computing. We shall leave extensions of our analyses to include fairness considerations
for future work.
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Schedule Description Matching ratio, α Waiting ratio, β
CSFCFS FCFS matching Θ(A) 1
CSgreedy Greedy matching Ω(A
1/2) 1
CS0≤γ<1/2 Subcritical rate matching Ω(A
1/2−γ) Θ(1)
CSγ=1/2 Critical rate matching Θ(logA) Θ(1)
CS1/2<γ≤1 Supercritical rate matching Θ(1) Θ(τ
γ−1/2)
CSpatient Patient matching 1 Θ(τ
1/2)
CSbalanced Balanced matching Θ((logA)
1/3) Θ((logA)1/3)
Table 2. The range of expected matching and waiting ratios; CSbalanced is
discussed in Section 5. Recall from Eq. (10) and Eq. (11) the expected
matching ratio α ≡ α(A) = costCS(A)
costpatient(A)
(costpatient(A) = Θ(1)) and the
expected waiting ratio β ≡ β(τ ) = waitCS(τ)
waitgreedy(τ)
(waitgreedy(τ ) = Θ(τ
3/2)).
the expected matching ratio α(A) grows as a power law in A while the expected
waiting ratio β(τ) is finite. On the other hand, for γ > 1/2, we have a finite expected
matching ratio but an expected waiting ratio that grows polynomially. Finally, at
the critical point γ = 1/2, the expected matching ratio grows to infinity for large A,
but at a slow, logarithmic rate (Θ(logA)). Notably, the phase transition at γ = 1/2
signifies a discontinuity of the expected matching ratio, so it is a first-order phase
transition; by contrast, the expected waiting ratio exhibits no such discontinuity,
signifying a second-order phase transition.
The infinite matching ratio vis-a-vis the finite waiting ratio for γ = 1/2 suggests
that further fine-tuning should be possible and, indeed, the ‘balanced’ schedule
CSbalanced (which we define and discuss in Section 5) reduces the growth of the
expected matching ratio by a factor of (logA)2/3 while increasing the expected
waiting ratio β(τ) by a factor of (log τ)1/3. In a sense (that we shall make precise
in the next section) this is as close as we can get to a ‘free lunch’ in this setting.
Formal statements. We now proceed to provide complete statements of the results
discussed above. To streamline our presentation, we have relegated the detailed
proofs to Appendices A and B; however, the main pattern of the proofs can also be
seen in Section 5 where we treat the case of CSbalanced.
We begin with our results for the matching cost ratio α:
Theorem 3. The expected matching ratios for the schedules under study are as
follows:
(CSFCFS) FCFS matching: αFCFS =
6λλ
pi2
A (15a)
(CSgreedy) Greedy matching: αgreedy ≥ 6λ
5pi2
A1/2 (15b)
(CS0≤γ<1/2) Subcritical rate matching: Cγ A
1/2−γ ≤ α0≤γ<1/2 ≤ Cγ A1−2γ
(15c)
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(CSγ=1/2) Critical rate matching:
2λ
pi2
logA ≤ αγ=1/2 ≤
λ
λ
1 + logA
log 2
(15d)
(CS1/2<γ≤1) Supercritical rate matching: α1/2<γ≤1 =
λ
λ
ζ(2γ)
log 2
(15e)
(CSpatient) Patient matching: αpatient = 1 (15f)
Remark. In the above, Cγ and Cγ are positive constants, and ζ(s) =
∑∞
n=1 1/n
s
denotes the Riemann zeta function (so ζ(s) <∞ for all s > 1).
By contrast, for the expected waiting ratio β, we have:
Theorem 4. The expected waiting ratios for the schedules under study are as follows:
(CSFCFS) FCFS matching: βFCFS = 1 (16a)
(CSgreedy) Greedy matching: βgreedy = 1 (16b)
(CS0≤γ<1/2) Subcritical rate matching: β0≤γ<1/2 = Θ(1) (16c)
(CSγ=1/2) Critical rate matching: βγ=1/2 = Θ(1) (16d)
(CS1/2<γ≤1) Supercritical rate matching: β1/2<γ≤1 = Θ(τ
γ−1/2) (16e)
(CSpatient) Patient matching: βpatient = Θ(τ
1/2) (16f)
In closing this section, it is worth noting that the bounds for α become asymp-
totically ‘less tight’ for small γ < 12 . As far as this gap is concerned, we conjecture
that the upper bound is the tight one: the lower bound is obtained via a crude
approximation using Jensen’s inequality, and this could be potentially tightened
(although we haven’t been able to do so). By contrast, the approximation for the
upper bound seems less drastic.
We should also note that the results in Theorem 4 are driven by the assumption
that the arrival of either a client or a provider at every stage of the process is
equally likely. This entails that the expected absolute difference of clients and
providers |NC(τ) − NP(τ)| can by approximated by a Wiener process as detailed
in Appendix B. For the latter we know that the expectation is
√
τ , so |NC(τ) −
NP(τ)| ≈
√
τ in expectation. It would be interesting to consider different arrival
processes such as an urn model with delayed replacement where |NC(τ) − NP(τ)|
would exhibit a different asymptotic behavior; we leave this analysis to future work.
5. A balanced social planner
Until now, we have analyzed clearing schedules based on the trade-off between
waiting time and matching cost, but without explicitly comparing the two. In this
section, we shall commit to a specific class of utility functions in order to make an
explicit comparison between these otherwise incomparable quantities.
To that end, let u(·) denote the expected utility (or ‘welfare’) of the social planner
given a specific clearing schedules. Assume further that the functions expressing
this utility depend on both the expected matching cost and the expected waiting
time via the additively separable expression
u(CS) = ucost(αCS) + uwait(βCS) (17)
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In order to make comparisons between the utility components ucost and uwait we
shall first consider their respective maximum values. It is then natural to assume
that ucost is maximal for the patient clearing schedule (which minimizes matching
cost) and that uwait is maximal for the greedy clearing schedule (which minimizes
waiting time). We shall thus assume that the two maxima are of the same order,
viz.,
σ · ucost(αpatient) = (1− σ) · uwait(βgreedy) (18)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant factor that specifies the relative importances of the
disutilities from mismatching versus waiting. Naturally, we require that the social
planner seeks to minimize both the costs of matching and the agents’ waiting time.
As such, we make the assumption that ucost is a concave function that decreases in
the expected matching cost, and uwait is a concave function that decreases in the
expected waiting time.
In view of all this, a social planner is said to be balanced if the disutilities from
mismatching and waiting display similar growths for large τ . That is, for a given
clearing schedule CS with expected matching ratio α and expected waiting time β,
we assume that
ucost(αCS) = Θ(uwait(βCS)) whenever αCS = Θ(βCS) (19)
In this general context, we obtain the following result governing balanced social
planning:
Theorem 5. Let CSbalanced be the clearing schedule that matches the k-th couple
when N − (k − 1) = ⌈k1/2(log k)1/3⌉ players are on the short side of the mar-
ket. The expected matching and waiting ratios incurred by CSbalanced are both
Θ((logA)1/3); moreover, any other schedule CSf achieving this balance has f(k) =
Θ(k1/2(log k)1/3).
Remark. For technical reasons we state our result in terms of the number of matched
couples (A = A(τ)). Note that, for any clearing schedule where the proportion of
matched players increases over time (more precisely, where limτ→∞
A(τ)
NC(τ)+NP(τ)
=
1), A is growing at the same rate as τ .
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider a clearing schedule of the form CSf that matches
the k-th couple when ⌈f(k)⌉ players on the short side of the market. In order
to balance the expected matching and waiting ratios, any such clearing schedule
would have to satisfy f(k) = ω(
√
k); otherwise, the expected matching ratio would
dominate asymptotically the expected waiting ratio (see Table 2). Thus, without
loss of generality, we can assume that f(k) is non-decreasing for large k.
Let t(k, f(k)) be the stopping time for the event that for the k-th time at least
f(k) clients and f(k) providers are in the market, assuming that every time this
is the case one client and one provider are removed. Finally, recall that Sτ =
NC(τ) − NP(τ) is the difference of clients and providers who have arrived to the
market until τ .
We begin with the expected matching ratio. For the upper bound we have:
E
[
A∑
k=1
1
(⌈f(k)⌉+ |St(k,f(k))|)⌈f(k)⌉
]
=
A∑
k=1
E
[
1
(⌈f(k)⌉+ |St(k,f(k))|)⌈f(k)⌉
]
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≤
A∑
k=1
⌈f(k)⌉−2 (20)
For the lower bound, an algebraic argument which we make precise in Appendix A
(cf. Eq. (58)) shows that E[t(k, f(k))] < 10k. Furthermore, note that E[St] is strictly
increasing in t. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality, and Lemma 9 (which is bounding |St|
via a combinatorial argument and using Stirling’s formula), we get:
A∑
k=1
E
[
1
(⌈f(k)⌉+ |St(k,f(k))|)⌈f(k)⌉
]
≥
A∑
k=1
1
(⌈f(k)⌉+ E[|S10k|])⌈f(k)⌉
≥ pi√
2e
A∑
k=1
1
(⌈f(k)⌉+
√
10k)⌈f(k)⌉
= Θ
(
A∑
k=1
1
f(k)2
)
(21)
where the last line follows from the assumption f(k) = ω(k1/2). Thus the two
bounds together with the fact that the patient schedule has finite matching cost
yield the result that, for f(k) = ω(k1/2) the expected matching ratio is α(A) =
Θ
(∑A
k=1 1/[f(k)
2]
)
.
We proceed, by considering the incurred waiting time. Recall that N(τ)− A(τ)
is the number of agents on the shorter side of the market at time τ , so N − A =
⌈f(k − 1)⌉ − 1 after the (k − 1)-st match. The number of clients and the number
of providers that need to arrive to the market before the k-th match is thus upper
bounded by
⌈f(k)⌉ − (⌈f(k − 1)⌉ − 1) = 1 + ⌈f(k)⌉ − ⌈f(k − 1)⌉ ≤ 2 (22)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f(k) = o(k) is a necessary
condition for a feasible clearing schedule (that is, a clearing schedule where the
proportion of unmatched versus matched players is decreasing). The expected
waiting time accrued between the (k − 1)-st and the k-th match is therefore upper
bounded by:
∆k := E[time s.t. ≥ 2 clients & ≥ 2 providers enter market]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:∆1k
· (2⌈f(k)⌉+ ⌈g(k)⌉)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:∆2k
(23)
where ⌈g(k)⌉ is a function that we will use to upper bound |Sk|, viz., the random
variable constituting the absolute difference of clients and providers in the market
at time τ(k). For posterity, note also that∆1k is the expectation of the time between
the (k− 1)-th and the k-th match and ∆2k provides an upper bound for the number
of agents waiting in the time interval between the (k − 1)-th and the k-th match.
Given the arrival of agents is governed by a Poisson clock of rate one, we have
∆1k = 5, i.e., on average, five agents need to enter the market to have at least two
clients and at least two providers. To see this, let Y be the number of flips of
a coin required to observe at least 2 heads (clients) and 2 tails (providers). The
event ‘Y > k’ is then equivalent to the union of the events ‘
(
k
k−1
)
heads’ and
‘
(
k
k−1
)
tails’. The two latter events are disjoint and each has probability k
2k
. Thus
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P[Y > k] = k
2k−1
and we have
E[Y ] =
∞∑
k=0
P(Y > k) = 1 + 2
∞∑
k=1
k
2k
= 1 + 2
∞∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
1
2k
(24)
= 1 + 2
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
k=j
1
2k
= 1 + 2
∞∑
j=1
1
2j−1
= 5 (25)
We thus have for Eq. (23)
∆k = 5 ·
(
2⌈f(k)⌉+ ⌈g(k)⌉) (26)
Next, to choose the function g(k), note that the law of the iterated logarithm gives
lim
k→∞
|Sk|√
2k log log k
= 1. (27)
Hence, by choosing g(k) =
√
2k log log k, the random variable |Sk| is asymptotically
bounded from above by g(k) with probability one.
We consider two cases below, which are exhaustive by Hardy (1910, Theorem,
page 18):
Case 1: f(k) = Ω(g(k)). For the first case we have:
5 · (2f(k) + g(k)) = Θ(f(k)) (28)
The expected waiting ratio until A pairs have been matched is bounded from above
by A−3/2
∑A
k=1Θ(f(k)), where we are using the fact that the expected waiting time
for the greedy schedule is given by A3/2 (see Proposition 1). A trivial lower bound
for the expected waiting ratio is then given by
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
2f(k) =
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
Θ(f(k)) (29)
Thus, the expected waiting ratio is given by
β(A) = Θ
(
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
f(k)
)
(30)
Moving to the comparison of matching and waiting ratios, we recall that ucost
and uwait are decreasing and concave and are of the same order (by assumption).
Thus u = ucost + uwait is maximized if and only if α = Θ(β). In turn, this holds if
and only if
A∑
k=1
1
f(k)2
= Θ
(
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
f(k)
)
(31)
or, equivalently, if and only if∫ A
1
1
f(x)2
dx = Θ
(
1
A3/2
∫ A
1
f(x) dx
)
(32)
where the asymptotic passage from summation to integration – i.e., from Eq. (31)
to Eq. (32) – is made precise in Appendix C.
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We shall show that f(x) = Θ(
√
x(log x)1/3) is the unique solution to Eq. (32) up
to order. To simplify notation, let f(x) =
√
x(log x)1/3, so the left-hand side (LHS)
of Eq. (32) becomes ∫ A
1
1
x(log x)2/3
= 3(logA)1/3 + c (33)
where c is uniformly bounded and independent of A. Next, focusing on the RHS of
Eq. (32), we get
1
A3/2
∫ A
1
√
x(log x)1/3 dx = (logA)1/3 − 1
A3/2
∫ A
1
x3/2
1
3x(log x)2/3
dx
= (logA)1/3 − 1
A3/2
∫ A
1
√
x
1
3(log x)2/3
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=o
( ∫
A
1
√
x·(log x)1/3 dx
)
= Θ((logA)1/3) (34)
Our uniqueness claim follows by noting that the LHS of Eq. (32) is decreasing in
f(x) (in orders of magnitude of the upper bound of the integral) while the right-
hand side (RHS) is increasing in f(x).
Case 2: f(k) = o(g(k)). For the second case, assume that f(k) = o(g(k)). This
implies for the matching cost that19∫ A
1
1
f(τ)2
dτ = ω
(∫ A
1
1
g(τ)2
dτ
)
(35)
The integral on the RHS of Eq. (35) can then be bounded from below as follows∫ A
1
1
g(τ)2
dτ =
∫ A
1
1
4τ log log τ
dτ = ω
(∫ A
1
1
4τ(log τ)2/3
dτ
)
(36)
For the integral on the RHS of Eq. (36) we have∫ A
1
1
4τ(log τ)2/3
dτ = Θ
(
(logA)1/3
)
, (37)
Hence, combining these last approximations, we finally get∫ A
1
1
f(τ)2
dτ = ω
(
(logA)1/3
)
. (38)
Thus any solution satisfying f(k) = o(g(k)) (Case 2) has expected matching cost
that is ω(1) relative to the optimal solution. This completes the proof that f(k) =
Θ(
√
x(log x)1/3) is the unique optimal clearing schedules for the balanced social
planner. 
Note that, up to logarithmic factors, the balanced clearing schedule is close to
the clearing schedule CSγ=1/2 which signifies a first-order phase transition for the
expected matching ratio. As discussed earlier, CSγ=1/2 only signifies a second-order
phase transition for the expected waiting ratio, thus explaining the gap between
19Formally, for τ ≥ e, the integrand is not well-defined, but the Cauchy principal value of
the integral remains finite, and this is the value we are using for τ ≤ e. This issue could be
side-stepped by shifting the lower limit of the integral to a higher value, but we do not do so in
order to simplify the presentation.
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CSbalanced and CSγ=1/2. In practice however, CSγ=1/2 seems to be a reasonable
approximation for a balanced social planner.
6. Generalization
So far, we focused our attention on dynamic clearing games with exponentially
distributed match costs. We shall show below that the developed techniques can
also be used to study a more abstract model. Rather than modeling match costs
directly by defining the distribution of each potential match cost, wij , we take a
macroscopic viewpoint and posit that the cost of matching a couple depends on
the number of clients and providers currently in the market. This cost may be
the expected cost of matching the cheapest couple or a cost associated to market
making more generally. In practice, this cost can be learned from past data on
clearing events. We shall thus focus our generalization on identifying breaking
points and their respective consequences for different cost regimes.
Write MC(τ) = NC(τ) −A(τ) for the number of clients in the market at time τ
and MP(τ) = NP(τ) − A(τ) for the number of providers respectively. Then, the
expected cost can be written w.l.o.g. as
g(MC,MP) (39)
where g : R+ × R+ → R+ is a non-increasing function (in either argument).20 In-
tuitively, g determines how the expected minimum cost of matching decreases as
more players coexist in the market. For example, if g(MC ,MP) = 1MC ·MP , we revert
to the previous analysis resulting from exponentially distributed match costs. This
is the case since the expected minimum of MC ·MP independent exp(1) random
variables is equal to 1MC·MP .
In view of this, it stands to reason that the asymptotic behavior of the market will
be captured by the rate at which the expected minimum matching cost g(MC,MP)
vanishes as a function of MC ,MP → ∞. Theorem 6 below makes this intuition
precise and identifies a specific threshold beyond which it is possible to get a ‘free
lunch’. We restrict our analysis to the case δ > 1 to guarantee that the patient
clearing schedule has finite expected matching cost, i.e., costpatient <∞.
Theorem 6. Suppose that the expected minimum matching cost decays as g(Θ(x),Θ(x)) =
Θ(1/xδ) for some δ > 1.Then:
(i) For 1 < δ ≤ 2 there is no ‘free lunch’. In particular, the critical rate
clearing schedule, that is, the clearing schedule with expected matching ratio
Θ(log(A)), is given by CSγ=1/δ.
(ii) For δ > 2, ‘free lunch’ exists. In particular, the clearing schedules CSγ with
γ ∈ (1δ , 12 ] guarantee that the expected matching and waiting ratios are both
finite.
Proof of Theorem 6. We first consider the upper bound. Given g(Θ(x),Θ(x)) =
Θ
(
1
xδ
)
and since g is increasing in both arguments we have:
E
[
A∑
k=1
g(MC ,MP)
∣∣∣∣∣min{MC,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋
]
≤
A∑
k=1
g(⌊k1/δ⌋, ⌊k1/δ⌋)
20We define the function g on the real numbers, but note that it is only the values on N × N
which enter the analysis of clearing schedules.
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= Θ
(
A∑
k=1
1
k
)
= Θ(logA) (40)
where the last inequality follows from the bounds for the harmonic series. Thus,
given the optimal clearing schedule has finite matching cost, the expected matching
ratio is smaller than O(logA+ 1).
For the lower bound note that E[t(k, k1/δ)] < 10k by similar arguments as in
Eq. (58) and by recalling that δ > 1. Thus, combining Jensen’s inequality ( 1x is
convex) with Markov’s inequality, Lemma 9, and recalling that δ ≤ 2 we get:
A∑
k=1
E
[
g(MC,MP)
∣∣∣min{MC,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋]
=
A∑
k=1
E
[
g(MC ,MP)
∣∣∣min{MC,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋, t(k, k1/δ) < 20k] · P [t(k, k1/δ) < 20k]
+
A∑
k=1
E
[
g(MC ,MP)
∣∣∣min{MC ,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋, t(k, k1/δ) > 20k] · P[t(k, k1/δ) > 20k]
≥
A∑
k=1
E
[
g(MC ,MP)
∣∣∣min{MC,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋, t(k, k1/δ) < 20k] · 1
2
= Θ
(
A∑
k=1
g(⌊k1/δ⌋, ⌊k1/δ⌋)
)
= Θ
(
A∑
k=1
1
k
)
= Θ(logA) (41)
where we used thatMC = Θ(MP) given |St| = |NC(t)−NP(t)| = |MC(t)−MP(t)| =
O(
√
20k) since we are in the case t(k, k1/δ) < 20k and by the assumption that for
all λ, µ we have g(λ · x, µ · x) = Θ(xδ). Thus, given the optimal clearing schedule
has finite matching cost, the expected matching ratio is Ω(logA), concluding the
proof together with the upper bound.
To summarize, for δ ∈ (1, 2] the critical rate clearing schedule is given by CSγ=1/δ.
Thus the critical rate clearing schedules are given by CSγ with γ ∈ (0, 1/2] and by
Theorem 4, the expected waiting ratio for these schedules is not finite. Note that
the case δ = 2 is simply Theorem 2. We conclude that there is no ‘free lunch’.
(2) By Theorem 4 the expected waiting ratio is finite for all clearing schedules
CSγ with γ ≤ 12 .
We upper bound the expected matching ratio for the clearing schedule CSγ for
γ > 1δ : For the upper bound we have with g(Θ(x),Θ(x)) = Θ
(
1
xδ
)
:
E
[
A∑
k=1
g(MC,MP)
∣∣∣∣∣min{MC,MP} = ⌊k1/δ⌋
]
≤
A∑
k=1
g(⌊k1/δ⌋, ⌊k1/δ⌋)
= Θ
(
A∑
k=1
1
kγ·δ
)
= Θ(1) (42)
where the last identity holds since γ > 1δ .
Thus, for given δ the clearing schedules CSγ with γ ∈ (1δ , 12 ] guarantee that the
expected matching ratio and waiting ratio are both finite, i.e., free lunch. 
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Theorem 6(i) extends our previous analysis by showing how the critical rate
clearing schedule moves dependent on δ. In fact Theorem 6(ii) shows that the
conclusion of Theorem 2 does not hold for the regime δ > 2, that is, there exists
a free lunch and in particular it is achieved by the clearing schedules CSγ with
γ ∈ (1δ , 12 ]. This is because for quickly decaying matching costs it becomes easier
to choose a ‘good’ schedule, and thus the ‘window of opportunity’ is increasing
in the derivative of g. One can build intuition for this result by reasoning about
market settings that differ in terms of match cost variability: in markets where
match costs are generally rather similar, thickening the market by waiting will only
lead to a meaningful positive effect in terms of expected match cost reduction when
waiting for a long time. By contrast, when match costs vary substantially, match
costs reduce in expectation with much less delay, thus making it more likely for a
mechanism designer to get a free lunch. Importantly, the clearing schedule CSgreedy
is never optimal when dealing with many types, independent of the match cost
distribution at hand.
7. Discussion
In this paper, we studied the dynamic clearing game, where heterogeneous clients
and providers arrive uncoordinatedly in order to be matched. We studied the trade-
off a social planner is facing between two competing objectives: a) to reduce players’
waiting time before getting matched; and b) to form efficient pairs in order to reduce
matching cost.
Our analysis of the dynamic clearing game reveals that a multi-objective social
planner often faces a substantial trade-off. Starting with the micro-founded model
for match costs we showed that there exists no free lunch, that is, there is no
clearing schedule that is approximately optimal in terms of both waiting time and
matching cost. We identified a unique breaking point where a stark reduction in
matching cost compared to a stark increase in waiting cost occurs. In line with
recent works by Ashlagi et al. (2017), Ashlagi et al. (2018) and many others, we
focused on a concrete class of social welfare functions that weigh costs from waiting
versus matching on a comparable scale and identify the optimal clearing schedule,
namely, the clearing schedule that matches the k-th couple when Θ(
√
k(log k)1/3)
players are on the short side of the market.
Generalizing the model, we abstract away from modeling match costs directly
and take a macroscopic viewpoint. Positing that the cost of matching a couple
depends on the number of clients and providers currently in the market we identify
two regimes. One, where no free lunch continues to hold, the other, where there is
a window of opportunity to be optimal along both dimensions, that is free lunch.
There are multiple directions in which our analysis could be extended. Perhaps
the most evident avenue for future research is to model market participation be-
havior game-theoretically, which would lead to new strategic considerations and
probably induce other matchings (see, e.g., Baccara et al. 2018). This analysis
could be pursued in more applied contexts, for instance relating to our motivating
example of a labor market with a central employment bureau, where waiting costs
could be interpreted as benefits payable by the bureau. An unemployed worker
might forgo some of these benefits by (repeatedly) rejecting matches. This is the
case because longer waiting, even though borne out of strategic behavior, may im-
prove the match quality (reducing matching cost).
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A second route for further investigation is to enlarge the options of the social
planner in terms of clearing schedules. For one, the social planner could be learning
from market observations about the distribution of match costs, which incidentally
we may also allow to follow other, more general classes of distributions. This
would allow the social planner to formulate more sophisticated clearing schedules
that incorporate match costs between players that are currently in the market. In
particular, if the social planner learns that a given agent may be ‘hard to match’,
then it might be sensible to match that agent directly and not incur further waiting
cost. Furthermore, the social planner may want to match more than one couple at
a time.
The study of dynamic market institutions is clearly fascinating, with tremen-
dous scope for progress in (old and new) applications, where research has only just
started. Our contribution has been to go beyond binary match values, and to iden-
tify breaking points under incomplete information. We hope that our framework
is able to provide fertile ground for further research, both theoretical and applied
to real-world market contexts, in particular as regards thinking about whether the
kinds of breaking points we describe are relevant in the optimal design of such
markets.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
Before turning to the proof we introduce the following definition and lemmas.
Definition 7. Let X1, X2, . . . be iid random variables with P[Xi = 1] = P[Xi =
−1] = 12 .
• Let Sk =
∑k
i=1Xi.
• Let t(k, C) be the stopping time for the event that for the k-th time at least
C clients and C providers are in the market, assuming that every time this
is the case one client and one provider are removed.
Lemma 8. Let wij ∼ exp(λj) for j = 1, 2, . . . , N , be a family of independent expo-
nentially distributed random variables. Then
min{wi1, wi2, . . . , wiN} ∼ exp

 N∑
j=1
λj

. (43)
In particular, if for all j, λj = 1, then E[minj wij ] =
1
N .
Proof. This proof is standard but we repeat it for the sake of completeness. The
random variable wij has cumulative distribution function
Fwij = P(wij ≤ x) = 1− e−λjx for all x > 0 and all j = 1, 2, . . . , N . (44)
Now, define the random variable Y = min{wi1, wi2, . . . , wiN}. Then, the cumula-
tive distribution function of Y is
FY (y) = P(Y ≤ y)
= 1− P(Y ≥ y)
= 1− P(min{wi1, wi2, . . . , wiN} ≥ y)
= 1− P(wi1 ≥ y) · P(wi2 ≥ y) · . . . · P(wiN ≥ y)
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= 1− e−λ1y · e−λ2y · · · · · e−λNy
= 1− e−
∑N
j=1 λjy y > 0 (45)
The latter cumulative distribution function is that of an exponential variable with
parameter
∑N
j=1 λj . 
Lemma 9. For Sk defined as above we have:
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0.67 ·
√
k /
2pi
e2
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k ≤ E[|Sk|] ≤ e√
pi
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k / 1.23 ·
√
k (46)
Proof. The starting point of our proof is an intermediate result in the proof of the
limit of the expected absolute value of the 1-d random walk, which is detailed in
Hizak and Logozar (2011, Equations 29a and 29b) and is based on combinatorial
arguments via the binomial distribution:
E[|Sk|] =


1
2k−2
k
2
(
k − 1
k/2
)
=
k
2k
k!
[(k/2)!]2
for k even,
1
2k−1
k + 1
2
(
k
(k + 1)/2
)
=
k + 1
2k+1
(k + 1)!
[((k + 1)/2)!]2
for k odd.
(47)
Since E[|S2k|] = E[|S2k−1|] it suffices to analyze the case where k is even. To that
end, we will use Stirling’s formula to bound k! from above and below as√
2pi · kk+1/2 · e−k ≤ k! ≤ e · kk+1/2 · e−k (48)
For k even, we may bound |Sk| from above as:
E[|Sk|] = k
2k
k!
[(k/2)!]2
≤ k
2k
e · kk+ 12 · e−k
2pi · (k/2)k+1 · e−k =
e√
2pi
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k (49)
Next, we lower bound |Sk| for k even:
E[|Sk|] = k
2k
k!
[(k/2)!]2
≥ k
2k
√
2pi · kk+1/2 · e−k
e2 · (k/2)k+1 · e−k =
2pi
e2
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k (50)
This concludes the proof for k even. For k odd we have with the observation that
|Sk| = |Sk+1|:
2pi
e2
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k ≤ 2pi
e2
·
√
2
pi
·
√
2⌈k/2⌉ ≤ E[|Sk+1|] = E[|Sk|] (51a)
and
e√
pi
·
√
2
pi
·
√
k ≥ e√
pi
·
√
2
pi
· 1√
2
·
√
2⌈k/2⌉ ≥ E[|Sk+1|] = E[|Sk|] (51b)

For the sake of limiting notation the proposition and proof are stated for the
clearing schedules with f(k) = ⌈kγ⌉ rather than for Θ(f). Adding constant upper
and lower bounds is straightforward and thus omitted. Recall that t(k, f(k)) is the
stopping time for the event that for the k-th time at least f(k) clients and f(k)
providers are in the market, assuming that every time this is the case one client
and one provider are removed.
21Note that limk→∞ E[|Sk|] =
√
2
pi
·
√
k (Peters, 1856).
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Proof of Theorem 3. Throughout the proof we shall simplify notation by omitting
the fact that some of the matching schedules are defined via the ceiling of functions
mapping to R+ (e.g., ⌈kγ⌉). The results are not changed by the omission since
match costs are never underestimated and overestimated by very little. Further,
while they are stated together in the proposition, we study the clearing schedules
CSγ = 0 and CS0<γ<1/2 separately since they require different arguments.
First come, first served (CSFCFS). In FCFS the cost of each match is the expectation
of a single match cost, that is λ. After A matches have occurred, the expected
incurred cost is λA. Thus, given the patient clearing schedule has cost bounded
above by pi
2
6λ , the expected matching ratio is equal to
λ·A
pi2/(6λ) .
Before stating the proofs for the other results recall from the proof of Propo-
sition 1, that the exponential distribution is closed under scaling. We shall thus
simplify notation and assume that for all i, j wij ∼ exp(1). Note that, for lower
bounds the scaling factor 1
λ
needs to be applied and for upper bounds the scaling 1λ
needs to be applied. But note that those scaling factors are constant with respect
to τ (and thus A) and therefore do not influence the orders of the limiting results.
Greedy matching (CSgreedy). The k-th match happens when the minimum of the
number of clients and providers who already arrived to the market is k, that is,
at time t(k, 1). The expected weight of the k-th match depends on the number of
players currently present on the long side of the market (since on the short side
there is only one agent). This random variable is given by |St(k,1)|+1. By Lemma 8
the expected weight thus is E[ 1|St(k,1)|+1 ]. The first Amatches thus have an expected
cost of
E[
A∑
k=1
1
|St(k,1)|+ 1
]. (52)
Given that we study fixed A (the number of matches that) we have:22
E
[
A∑
k=1
1
|St(k,1)|+ 1
]
=
A∑
k=1
E[
1
|St(k,1)|+ 1
] (53)
Next, by Jensen’s inequality ( 1x is convex) we have:
A∑
k=1
E[
1
|St(k,1)|+ 1
] >
A∑
k=1
1
E[|St(k,1)|+ 1]
=
A∑
k=1
1
E[|St(k,1)|] + 1
(54)
We shall now approximate E[t(k, 1)]. By Lemma 9 we have E[St] < 1.23
√
t. Thus
the short side of the market has t−1.23
√
t
2 agents. Setting k =
t−1.23√t
2 and solving
22Note that t (the total number of client and providers who have arrived to the market) depends
on A (and vice versa). Therefore, Wald (1944)’s equation does not apply and thus the route of
inquiry to study the matching cost at some continuous time τ does not work since we could not
interchange summation and expectation.
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the quadratic equation we find the crude upper bound for the expectation:23
E[t(k, 1)] =
(1.23 +√1.232 + 8k
2
)2
<
3
4
+ 2k + 2
√
k < 5k (55)
Returning to Eq. (54) we have with Lemma 9:
A∑
k=1
1
E[|St(k,1)|] + 1
>
A∑
k=1
1
E[|S5k|] + 1 >
1
1.23
A∑
k=1
1√
5k + 1
(56)
>
1
1.23
A · 1√
5A+ 1
> A · 1
5
√
A
=
√
A
5
(57)
Thus, given the optimal schedule has costpatient(A) ≤ pi26λ , the expected matching
ratio is lower bounded by
√
A
5pi2/(6λ) .
Subcritical matching (CSγ=0). We shall fix the clearing schedule such that it matches
a couple every time some fixed C ∈ N players are on the short side of the market
(N −A = C) and note that it belongs to the family of clearing schedules CSγ=0.
Next, note that t(k, C) = t(1, C)+ t(k−1, 1), since we assume that every time at
least C clients and C providers are in the market exactly one client and one provider
match and thus leave the market. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3(CSgreedy) we
can bound E[t(1, C)] from above by noting that it is equal to E[t(C, 1)]. Thus
E[t(k, C)] = E[t(C, 1)] + E[t(k − 1, 1)] < 5C + 5k (58)
With the latter and, as above by Jensen’s inequality ( 1x is convex) and Lemma 9
we have for the expected matching cost:
E[
A∑
k=1
1
(C + |St(k,C)|)C
] ≥
A∑
k=1
1
(C + E[|St(k,C)|])C
≥
A∑
k=1
1
(C + E[|S5C+5k|])C
≥ 1
1.23
A∑
k=1
1
(C +
√
5C + 5k)C
≥ A
1.23
· 1
(C +
√
5C + 5A)C
=
1
1.23 · C ·
A− C√
5C + 5A+ C
= Ω(
√
A) (59)
Thus, given the optimal clearing schedule has finite cost the expected matching
ratio is α(A) = Ω(
√
A).
The second part of the assertion follows by observing:
E[
A∑
k=1
1
(C + |St(k,C)|)C
] <
1
C
E[
A∑
k=1
1
1 + |St(k,1)|
] (60)
23 We solve k = t−1.23
√
t
2
. Setting t = u2 and rearranging we solve quadratic equation
u2 − u− 2k != 0. The solutions are:
u1,2 =
1.23±√1.232 + 8k
2
Given the variable transformation the positive solution is selected.
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Subcritical matching (CS0<γ<1/2). For the upper bound, by Lemma 8, we have:
E[
A∑
k=1
1
(kγ + |St(k,√k)|)kγ
] ≤
A∑
k=1
1
k2γ
= 1 +
A∑
k=2
1
k2γ
≤ 1 +
∫ A
x=1
1
x2γ
dx
= 1 +
[
1
1− 2γ x
1−2γ
]A
x=1
≤ 1 + 1
1− 2γA
1−2γ (61)
Thus, given the optimal clearing schedule has finite cost, the expected matching
ratio is α(A) = O(A1−2γ) for 0 < γ < 12 .
For the lower bound, note that t(k, kγ) < 10k for γ < 1 by similar arguments as
in Eq. (58). Further note that E[|St|] is strictly increasing in t. Thus, with Jensen’s
inequality ( 1x is convex):
A∑
k=1
E[
1
(kγ + |St(k,kγ )|)kγ
] >
A∑
k=1
1
(kγ + E[|S10k|])kγ >
1
1.23
A∑
k=1
1
(kγ +
√
10k)kγ
>
1
1.23(
√
10 + 1)
A∑
k=1
1
k
1
2+γ
>
1
6
∫ A
x=1
1
x
1
2+γ
dx
>
1
6
[
1
1
2 − γ
x
1
2−γ ]Ax=1 =Ω(A
1
2−γ) (62)
Critical matching (CSγ=1/2). For the upper bound, by Lemma 8, we have:
E[
A∑
k=1
1
(
√
k + |St(k,√k)|)
√
k
] <
A∑
k=1
1
k
≤ logA+ 1 (63)
where the last inequality follows from the bounds for the harmonic series. Thus,
given the optimal clearing schedule has finite matching cost (lower bounded by
log(2)
λ
), the expected matching ratio is smaller than
1
λ (logA+1)
log(2)/λ
.
For the lower bound note that E[t(k,
√
k)] < 10k by similar arguments as in
Eq. (58). Further note that St is strictly increasing in t. Thus, with Jensen’s
inequality ( 1x is convex) and Lemma 9:
A∑
k=1
E[
1
(
√
k + |St(k,√k)|)
√
k
] >
A∑
k=1
1
(
√
k + E[|S10k|])
√
k
>
1
1.23
A∑
k=1
1
(
√
k +
√
10k)
√
k
≥ 1
6
A∑
k=1
1
k
>
1
6
logA (64)
Thus, given the optimal clearing schedule has costpatient(A) ≤ pi26λ , the expected
matching ratio is bounded below by
1
6 logA
pi2/(6λ) =
λ
pi2 · logA.
Supercritical matching (CS1/2<γ≤1). As above, by Jensen’s inequality (since 1/x is
convex) and Lemma 8 we have:
E[
A∑
k=1
1
(kγ + |St(k,kγ )|)kγ
] <
A∑
k=1
E[
1
kγkγ
] =
A∑
k=1
1
k2γ
→ ζ(2γ) (65)
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where ζ is the Riemann zeta function and is known to converge for γ > 12 . Given
that we are considering a sum with positive summands convergence is from below.
Thus, given the optimal clearing schedule has finitematching cost (costpatient(A) ≥
log(2)
λ
), the expected matching ratio is bounded from above by (λ/λ) · ζ(2γ)/ log 2
for 12 < γ ≤ 1. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. First note that in order to compare different clearing schedules
we are interested in the additional waiting time incurred until some number A of
couples have been matched. Thus, we consider the waiting time until T for the
greedy schedule (the benchmark) and for other schedules the waiting time until Tˆ
where Tˆ is the expected time until under the given schedule the same number of
couples have been matched as in the greedy schedule until time T .
As in the Proof of Theorem 3 we shall simplify notation by omitting the fact
that some of the matching schedules are defined via the ceiling function of functions
mapping to R+ (e.g., ⌈kγ⌉). We invite the reader to convince her-or himself that
the results are not altered through this simplification.
Let τ(k) be the moment the k-th couple is matched (given a particular clearing
schedule). We proceed in a case-by-case basis below:
First come, first served (CSFCFS). It suffices to note that this clearing schedules
matches players at exactly the same moments as the greedy clearing schedules.
The result then follows.
Subcritical and critical matching (CS0≤γ≤1/2). We shall study the worst case such
clearing schedule with respect to waiting time. We consider two different parts. In
the first part we wait until at least T γ clients and T γ providers are in the market.
The second part then proceeds in the same way as the greedy clearing schedule,
keeping in mind that at all future times min{NC, NP} is exactly T γ. The expected
waiting time of the first schedule can be bounded above by the upper bound for
the expected time until T γ clients and T γ providers are in the market, that is,
E[τ(5T γ)] = 5T γ (see Eq. (55) in the proof of Theorem 3) noting that we used the
fact that the arrival of agents is governed by a Poisson clock of rate 1. Now, a
crude upper bound for the waiting time of the first part of the process is found be
assuming that all agents are in the market from the beginning (τ = 0), yielding the
upper bound 5T γ · 5T γ .
Note that, the first part of the process takes Tˆ − T time. For the remaining
second part of the process the waiting cost is the cost of the greedy schedule (23T
3/2)
plus the cost of the – in expectation – no more than 5T γ agents on each side of
the market to ‘remain’ for the subsequent periods. Thus the total waiting time is
bounded above by:
5T γ · 5T γ + 2
3
T 3/2 + 5T γ · T = Θ(T 3/2) (66)
Thus β(Tˆ ) = (3/2)Θ(T 3/2)/T 3/2 = Θ(1).
Supercritical matching (CS1/2<γ≤1). We first construct a lower bound. Consider the
alternative arrival process, where clients and providers alternatingly arrive to the
market. Note that for any given clearing schedule this process incurs lower waiting
time. For the clearing schedule we consider the waiting time of this alternative
arrival process is precisely governed by the fact that the k-th match takes place
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when at least kγ players are on the short side of the market. Further note that
Tˆ ≥ T . Thus, the waiting time is lower bounded by using the approximation by
the Wiener process (by arguments as in Proposition 1 and by observing that arrival
is governed by a Poisson clock of rate 1):∫ T
0
2τγdτ =
2
1 + γ
τ1+γ |T0 = Ω(T 1+γ) (67)
For the upper bound, we construct a clearing schedule that constitutes an upper
bound of the schedule under consideration. For fixed k, let T = τ(k) consider
the following clearing schedule: First wait until there are at least kγ clients and
providers in the market, then proceed with the greedy schedule such that at any
future point min{clients, providers} in the market is equal to kγ . Note that this
new schedule has the same total run time as the original schedule, that is, Tˆ .
Further it is evident that the waiting time occurred by the new schedule is greater
than the waiting time of the original schedule. By arguments as for (CSγ=0) and by
the fact that arrival is governed by a Poisson clock of rate 1 we can upper bound
the waiting time by:
5T γ · 5T γ + 2
3
T 3/2 + 5T γ · T = Θ(T 1+γ) (68)
since we assumed 12 < γ ≤ 1.
The two bounds together show that the waiting time of the originally considered
clearing schedule is Θ(T 1+γ).Thus β(Tˆ ) = Θ(T
1+γ)
(2/3) T 3/2
= Θ(T γ−
1
2 ).
Patient matching (CSpatient). First note that for the patient schedule Tˆ = T . The
expected waiting time for the patient schedule until time T is given by
E
[∫ T
0
NC(τ) +NP(τ) dτ
]
=
∫ T
0
E[NC(τ) +NP(τ)] dτ (69)
where the latter equality holds by Tonelli’s theorem (by noting that NC(τ)+NP(τ)
is non-negative). The expectation is with respect to the number of clients and
providers and with respect to the arrival times of the agents (governed by a Poisson
clock). Again by Tonelli’s theorem we can consider the case where the expectation
with respect to the arrival times is taken first. Then by the fact that the arrival of
agents is assumed to follow a Poisson clock of rate 1 we have:∫ T
0
E[NC(τ) +NP(τ)]dτ =
∫ T
0
⌊τ⌋dτ = Θ(T 2) (70)
Thus β(Tˆ ) = Θ(T
2)
2
3T
3/2 = Θ(
√
T ). 
Appendix C. Proof of approximation in Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of omitted approximation in Proof of Theorem 5. We begin by approximat-
ing the two sums in Eq. (31), i.e.,
A∑
k=1
1
f(k)2
= Θ
(
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
f(k)
)
(71)
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Recalling that f is assumed non-decreasing for large k, the summand on the left-
hand side is decreasing and∫ A
0
1
f(x)2
dx ≥
A∑
k=1
1
f(k)2
≥
∫ A+1
1
dx
f(x)2
(72)
Considering the meaning of f(k) it is without loss of generality to define f(x) = 1
for x ∈ [0, 1) since the summand 1f(k)2 remains decreasing. Thus the absolute
difference between the two bounds is bounded above by:∣∣∣∣∣
∫ A
0
1
f(x)2
dx −
∫ A+1
1
1
f(x)2
dx
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
1
f(x)2
dx−
∫ A+1
A
1
f(x)2
dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (73)
It follows that
A∑
k=1
1
f(k)2
= Θ
(∫ A+1
1
1
f(x)2
dx
)
(74)
Next consider the right-hand side of (31). The summand is increasing, so we
get:
1
A3/2
∫ A
0
f(x) dx ≤ 1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
f(k) ≤ 1
A3/2
∫ A+1
1
f(x) dx (75)
Now note that f(x) < x must hold. Thus the absolute difference between the two
bounds is bounded above by:
1
A3/2
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ A
0
f(x) dx−
∫ A+1
1
f(x) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1A3/2
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ A+1
A
f(x)dx −
∫ 1
0
f(x) dx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ A
A3/2
= O(1). (76)
It follows that
1
A3/2
A∑
k=1
f(k) = Θ
(
1
A3/2
∫ A+1
1
f(x) dx
)
(77)
With above approximations it follows that Eq. (31) holds if and only if the following
equation holds: ∫ A
1
1
f(x)2
dx = Θ
(
1
A3/2
∫ A
1
f(x) dx
)
(78)
as claimed. 
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